US President Donald Trump has once again stepped back from his earlier rhetoric of destroying Iran’s power plants and bridges, unilaterally extending the two-week ceasefire that was due to expire on April 22. He stated that the decision was taken at the request of Islamabad, claiming that Iran’s government was “seriously fractured”.
Trump has consistently asserted that he is winning the war. This is true to the extent that the United States and Israel have conducted a vast number of air strikes on thousands of Iranian strategic and tactical targets, significantly degrading its naval capabilities and missile-launching assets, and inflicting direct economic damage estimated to be between $145 billion and $300 billion. But he has not succeeded in compelling Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or accept his demands over uranium enrichment.
Trump has been seeking an honourable way out of the war since March 21, when he issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Tehran, threatening to destroy its civilian infrastructure. Since then, he has extended that ultimatum by 10 days, and followed it up with a two-week ceasefire, and now an indefinite ceasefire. However, Iran continues to be defiant.
Washington has made several concessions to keep talks with Tehran alive, including pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon, and, most notably, moving away from his insistence on zero uranium enrichment to a 20-year suspension of enrichment.
Notwithstanding the continuous barrage of threatening rhetoric, he is aware of the damage the war would have on his presidency if it were to continue. A majority of the American people oppose the war, making this a politically fragile conflict for the US leadership. The two principal pillars on which Trump won his second term were his commitment to avoid further wars and his promise to bring down inflation. The continuation of the war and the rising price of gasoline mean that Trump is being forced to look for an off-ramp. Current indications suggest that the Republicans risk losing their majority in Congress — and possibly even in the Senate — if there is no resolution soon.
Trump has stated that the ceasefire will continue to give Tehran time until “discussions are concluded”. While Iran is currently playing hardball, insisting that the United States lift the blockade on the movement of its ships as a precondition for a second round of talks, Trump is unlikely to do so as it represents the most effective strategy to curtail Iran’s oil revenues without needing to occupy Kharg Island.
After Trump secured a ceasefire in Lebanon, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, stated that the Strait of Hormuz was open for free movement. However, when Trump insisted on maintaining the blockade, the hardline factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps prevailed and linked any subsequent discussions with the United States to its lifting. Thus, while direct talks may not resume immediately, mediation is expected to continue in an effort to reach some common ground.
Is there a solution to this impasse?
It would also be in Iran’s interest to end the war, provided its basic demands are met — namely, a guarantee that the United States and/or Israel will not attack it again, relief from sanctions , and control over the Strait of Hormuz, including the ability to generate revenue by charging a transit fee. While Trump has previously indicated that he might consider sharing revenue from the strait, such a proposal would face opposition not only from the Gulf states but also from most other countries that use it for trade purposes.
What Iran seeks, however, is a mechanism for revenue generation to support its post-war reconstruction. This could be achieved through innovative arrangements, such as allowing it to levy a transit fee for a fixed period of time or establishing a reconstruction fund in which Gulf countries could participate, provided peace and security are restored in the region.
From Iran’s perspective, it is crucial that its right to enrich uranium is recognised even if this is operationalised through a temporary suspension for a stipulated period. Iran is seeking to limit this to five years. It may also be willing to down-blend its 60 per cent enriched uranium, as it did with its 20 per cent enriched uranium after signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 with the Obama administration. Unlike the JCPOA, which had a duration of 15 years, Iran may be willing to agree to a framework but without a fixed timeframe. It may also be prepared to commit to not developing very long-range missiles. Trump, on the other hand, could claim success by saying that Hezbollah has been decimated in Lebanon. These could be the off-ramps both seek.
It is hoped that a framework agreement can be reached between the two sides, with the details to be worked out by technical teams. It is worth remembering that the JCPOA took more than two years to be finalised. While any such agreement may be opposed by Israel, it would enable Trump to claim victory and focus on the visit of King Charles III at the end of this month and his own visit to China in mid-May.
The writer is former governor of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, former ambassador to Egypt and former permanent representative to Arab League
