Officially concluding over 30 years of diplomatic seclusion for the self-declared republic on Somalia’s northern coastline, Israel became the inaugural UN member state to acknowledge Somaliland’s independence in late December 2025. The declaration issued on December 26, 2025, triggered swift reactions throughout Africa and the Middle East. The action was denounced by the Somali Federal Government as a breach of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Mogadishu, protests broke out, and within days Egypt made it clear that it would increase military and security cooperation with Somalia, placing the defence of Somali territorial integrity at the forefront of its regional strategy.
This acknowledgement has transformed what was once a marginal dispute into a geopolitical fault line with global ramifications. The status of Somaliland, the security of the Red Sea and Egypt’s increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa are now closely intertwined. These developments are more than a diplomatic disagreement over borders; they mark the opening of a new geopolitical struggle for control over one of the world’s most significant maritime routes.
The rapid unfolding of recent events has reshaped the region’s strategic landscape. The Horn of Africa, once viewed largely through the narrow prism of humanitarian crises and counter-piracy operations, has emerged as a critical geopolitical theatre. The balance of power in the Red Sea, the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the future of African boundary norms are all at stake.
Historical Context
Egypt’s growing interest in Somalia and Somaliland must be analysed within a broader historical framework. Egypt has long regarded the Red Sea as an extension of its national defence perimeter. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, maritime security became a central pillar of Cairo’s strategic thinking as the canal evolved into a major artery of global trade. During the Cold War, Egypt’s engagement in the Horn of Africa was shaped by concerns over the security of maritime routes between Europe and Asia, Israeli naval capabilities and Soviet involvement in the region. Deep diplomatic engagement with Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea was viewed as an essential component of Egypt’s strategic depth.
Although Egypt’s attention shifted largely towards the Middle East after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, it retained the conviction that instability in the Horn of Africa could endanger its maritime lifeline. This concern has gained renewed urgency as foreign naval bases proliferate along the Red Sea coastline and armed non-state actors target commercial shipping. Ethiopia’s growing regional prominence has further intensified Cairo’s anxieties.
Ethiopia’s economic expansion, assertive diplomacy and military modernisation—particularly in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—have challenged Egypt’s longstanding dominance in Nile Basin affairs. Consequently, Addis Ababa’s ambition to secure permanent access to the sea has been interpreted in Cairo not merely as an economic objective, but as a strategic challenge. Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, granting access to Berbera Port and signalling the possibility of diplomatic recognition, was thus perceived by Egypt as a potential shift in the regional balance of power.
The Red Sea Corridor and the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa occupies a pivotal position in the global system. Situated at the crossroads of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, it controls access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—a narrow maritime passage linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Millions of barrels of oil and trillions of dollars’ worth of goods transit this corridor annually en route to Europe via the Suez Canal. According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 12 per cent of the world’s seaborne petroleum trade passes through the Bab el-Mandeb, placing it alongside the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca as one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
Over the past two years, the vulnerability of this route has become starkly evident. Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the southern Red Sea have forced several major shipping companies to divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. These reroutings have resulted in significantly longer transit times, higher insurance premiums and sharply increased freight costs, as documented in a series of reports by Reuters and Lloyd’s.
For Egypt, instability at the Bab el-Mandeb poses a direct economic and national security threat, given the country’s reliance on Suez Canal revenues. World Bank estimates indicate that canal receipts account for approximately 2 to 2.5 per cent of Egypt’s GDP and remain one of its most important sources of foreign exchange. Under these circumstances, control over the southern gateway to the Red Sea has assumed heightened strategic importance. The Horn of Africa is no longer a peripheral strategic outpost; it has moved to the centre of global maritime security.
Ports, Power and the Battle for Berbera
At the heart of this evolving contest lies Berbera, located along Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coastline on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Historically, Berbera functioned as a regional commercial hub, linking Arabian markets with the Ethiopian hinterland. Over the past decade, however, a major port expansion project led by Dubai-based DP World has transformed it into a modern logistics platform. Reuters investigations indicate that DP World’s $442 million investment has upgraded Berbera’s infrastructure, expanded its container-handling capacity and integrated it into a broader network of ports spanning the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
For Ethiopia, Berbera offers a potential alternative to Djibouti, which currently handles over 90 per cent of its maritime trade. For the Gulf states, the port serves as a logistical bridge between East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Its proximity to Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait also makes it an attractive site for naval logistics and maritime surveillance. In recent years, scholars and policy analysts have increasingly argued that ports are no longer neutral commercial assets, but instruments of geopolitical influence. From this perspective, infrastructure constitutes power, and control over logistics networks translates into strategic leverage. Berbera’s rise has therefore placed Somaliland at the centre of a broader struggle over Indian Ocean trade routes and Red Sea security.
Way Forward
Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has established itself as one of the Horn of Africa’s most stable political entities. It has built functioning state institutions, held multiple competitive elections and maintained a relative degree of peace in a region beset by persistent conflict. Despite meeting many empirical criteria for statehood, it remained diplomatically unrecognised for more than three decades. Israel’s decision to recognise Somaliland has altered this long-standing equation. The move has elevated Somaliland’s international profile while drawing external actors more deeply into the region’s complex political dynamics.
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has rejected any attempt to alter Somalia’s borders, and the Somali Federal Government has condemned Israel’s action as a violation of its sovereignty. Egypt has consequently been compelled to reassess its regional strategy. Egyptian officials have stated unequivocally that Cairo opposes any unilateral measures that establish rival political authorities within Somalia. In an effort to prevent further recognition of Somaliland, Egypt has expanded its military training and advisory missions in Somalia and intensified diplomatic engagement within the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. According to a recent report in The National, a leading UAE-based publication, Egypt has broadened the scope of its security mission in Somalia, framing the defence of Mogadishu’s authority as a core national security objective.
For Cairo, Somalia has thus emerged as the linchpin of its forward defence strategy in the Red Sea. By embedding itself within Somalia’s political and security architecture, Egypt seeks to preserve a regional order that constrains Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, limits the proliferation of foreign military bases along the African coast and safeguards the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. Viewed together, Ethiopia’s pursuit of independent Red Sea access, Egypt’s expanding security presence in Somalia and Israel’s diplomatic recognition of Somaliland point towards the emergence of a tightly interlinked strategic triangle reshaping power dynamics in the Horn of Africa.
The Horn of Africa is no longer a distant arena defined primarily by counter-terrorism and humanitarian intervention. It has become a central battleground for competition over regional security, infrastructure influence and maritime politics. From the cranes of Berbera to the warships near Bab el-Mandeb, a new geopolitical order is taking shape. Israel’s Red Sea strategy, Somaliland’s diplomatic gamble and Egypt’s strategic realignment have combined to create a volatile mix of risks and opportunities. The new Great Game is not confined to distant capitals; it is being fought across Africa and the Middle East, with consequences for the global economy. Its outcome will shape not only the future of the Horn of Africa, but also the security of one of the world’s most vital trade corridors.
(Dr Gayettri Dixit is Assistant Professor, Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Akshan Ranjan is PhD Research Scholar, Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
End of Article
