5 min readMay 8, 2026 06:30 AM IST
First published on: May 8, 2026 at 06:30 AM IST
On May 7, 2025 at 0105 hours, India launched Operation Sindoor with precision strikes on nine terrorist bases in Pakistan, to avenge the brutal killing of 26 civilians in Pahalgam. A year on, the operation deserves sober appraisal. Did we achieve our objective of lasting deterrence or did it merely reset the clock on a cycle of violence? More importantly, if Pakistan sponsors another terror attack, how should India respond? What should be the strategy for Sindoor 2.0?
Some analysts argue that India should have pressed the advantage further. Sindoor, however, was never intended to be a full-scale war. It was a response short of war — limited in scope, space and intensity, designed to punish the perpetrators of terror while preserving the option to escalate. When Pakistan sought a ceasefire on May 10, India accepted, as the objectives — destruction of terrorist infrastructure and a demonstrable punitive message — had been met. Yet deterrence is not a single act but a posture sustained over time by certainty, severity and credibility. So, sceptics may rightly ask whether deterrence will endure.
Sindoor’s political fallout for the Pakistan army was limited. Paradoxically, it has been able to recast itself as a stabilising force on the international stage, even as it retains the option to sponsor further proxy violence. After the defeat in 1971, the Pakistan army’s strategic calculus narrowed to asymmetric options to keep confrontation with India alive. Having refined irregular warfare during the Afghan conflict in the 1980s, it institutionalised proxy war as an instrument of state policy.
“War avoidance” is a key feature of the proxy war strategy. Pakistan calibrates terror attacks to invite only limited retaliation. This has become even more important today when its army is heavily committed on the Afghan front. Islamabad also leans on international actors to restrain escalation while invoking the spectre of nuclear war to deter a decisive Indian response.
Finally, the Pakistani military seeks a “notion of victory” from limited engagements. Small tactical gains are magnified through information operations to create a narrative of triumph at home and abroad, as was done during Sindoor.
Against any future terror strike, India must keep various response options ready in both the kinetic and non-kinetic domains. A kinetic strategy should rest on a response short of war, with escalation dominance at every stage; it must challenge Pakistan’s strategy of war avoidance, deny it any notion of victory, and enable a graduated shift from deterrence to compellence.
Deterrence depends on the adversary’s belief that retaliation will be both certain and consequential. The first response must therefore be faster and more consequential than in 2025. Higher readiness levels allow a shorter decision window, reducing the chances of international mediation restricting India’s options. Initial strikes should be intelligence-driven, targeting terrorist bases and HQs and also selectively striking military bases that support proxy networks. India’s naval superiority could be exploited.
India must plan to then absorb, deter and out-respond any Pakistani reprisals. That requires layered defensive safeguards: Robust air and missile defences, hardened and dispersed basing, resilient logistics and civil-protection measures. Offensively, responses should be phased, with verifiable victory markers at each stage.
Visible mobilisation of strike formations, even when not planning full-scale operations, will create a dire situation for Pakistan, which will need to relocate forces from the Afghan border — leaving it vulnerable against the BLA, TTP and Afghan army. Diplomatically, India must preempt third-party pressure for an early ceasefire by engaging world powers with justification for its actions. Militarily, we should combine credible conventional options with the reinforcement of the massive second-strike policy, even in response to tactical nuclear weapons, to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.
Beside preventing major damage to Indian bases, synchronised information operations, transparent attribution and the rapid release of forensic evidence are essential to shape domestic and international perceptions. Capturing objectives on the ground will blunt Pakistani propaganda.
Sindoor 2.0 should be designed not merely to punish but to extract concrete concessions. In return for the captured territory, India should insist on the repatriation and prosecution of terrorist leaders, dismantling of terror networks and public renunciation of state sponsorship for terrorism. A maritime blockade can be another important lever.
Operation Sindoor delivered tactical success, but possibly did not resolve the underlying strategic problem. The next iteration must be conceived as a coherent, multi-domain campaign that pairs swift, severe kinetic action with calibrated diplomatic, economic and information instruments. Its aim should be to compel a durable change in Pakistan’s calculus — making proxy warfare an unattractive and unsustainable policy choice.
The writer was GOC-in-C Western Command during Operation Sindoor
