Since the advent of the nuclear age, a great-power monopoly over fissile material and technology has sustained the larger non-proliferation “order”. When this architecture faced threats of sabotage of facilities and theft of materials in the 1990s — “nuclear terrorism” — the US administration’s policy emphasis shifted to “counterproliferation”, a more aggressive form of meeting non-proliferation objectives. It resorted to sanctions, military threats and interdictions to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These also contributed to the larger War on Terror narrative.
A glance at these counterproliferation policies reveals a paradox. While aimed at dismantling, through force, the alleged nuclear weapons programmes of countries like Iraq and Iran, they failed to prevent North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal. The 2003 military invasion of Iraq was undertaken on the premise that the Saddam Hussein regime intended to rebuild its limited enrichment, reprocessing, and centrifuge facilities. Without hard evidence that Iraq planned to develop nuclear weapons, the US-led coalition launched a bombing campaign. The 2001 terror attacks in New York provided the pretext for what was essentially a regime-change operation.
A similar fate has befallen Iran following a history of isolation and sanctions over its uranium enrichment programme. As a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, Iran has maintained that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. It has allowed IAEA inspections, albeit intermittently, and signed the Tehran Declaration in October 2003, the Additional Protocol in December 2003, and the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) in November 2004. In 2005, Iran submitted a proposal to resume limited enrichment for R&D and civilian use, but it was rejected. Subsequent US actions, from its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018 to the most recent operations in Iran, have brought the negotiations to a halt.
This raises disturbing questions. The narrative of an “imminent” weapon acquisition by states creates a norm of stovepiping unverified intelligence and selective information to the highest rungs of decision-making. It lays the ground for a pre-emptive war.
US counterproliferation efforts reveal a recurring pattern of distrust between agencies such as the IAEA and their domestic counterparts, reducing what should be an objective oversight exercise to one driven by predetermined goals. While both Iran and Iraq may have tended to falter on complete transparency, their largely voluntary compliance with international safeguards, as admitted by former IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei, has been met with unilateral strikes.
The policy also suffers from selective implementation. North Korea’s explicit nuclear ambitions, withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and its nuclear test in 2006 largely invited diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions instead of military coercion. Similarly, despite credible intelligence on the advancing nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan well before their 1998 tests, Washington prioritised broader geopolitical engagement in South Asia. While such strategic accommodation has arguably sustained a functional nuclear order, the selective application of “counterproliferation” policies has eroded the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. The resort to selective coercion may, ironically, have fuelled rather than suppressed the nuclear ambitions of countries such as Iran and generated cycles of defiance. This dynamic is particularly acute where the counterproliferation measures have undermined Article IV rights to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT.
As the non-proliferation discourse has, over time, been systematically conflated with counterproliferation, it has legitimised coercive responses in place of diplomatic engagement. This risks undermining the voluntary architecture upon which the nuclear security norms rest, alienating the states whose cooperation is essential.
The NPT Review Conference is underway in New York. Restoring consensus between nuclear and non-nuclear armed states hangs in the balance, while longstanding NPT members and US allies such as Japan and South Korea eye nuclear weapons capability. American unilateralism is a major obstacle. It is imperative to strengthen incentives for states to remain committed to the NPT. A good start would be a renewed emphasis on diplomacy.
The writer is assistant professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University
