The recent round of state elections in West Bengal, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Puducherry has clearly shown that Indian democracy is very much alive and kicking. It has redrawn India’s political map with the BJP now staking a stronger claim from the west to the east. While the BJP has won a third term in Assam, its maiden victory in West Bengal (WB) is particularly noteworthy. Mamata Banerjee not gracefully resigning from the chief minister’s post after having lost elections is unbecoming of the democratic traditions of India. As for how and why the Trinamool Congress (TMC) lost its 15-year hold on the state, there are as many explanations as there are experts. We will leave that crowded space aside and focus instead on the more pressing question of revdis vs development. The challenge before the new government in WB is straightforward: Can it move the state from its current 16th rank in per capita income to the levels of Haryana (third) and Gujarat (fifth), where it already has the advantage of longer governance experience?
During Banerjee’s tenure from 2011-12 to 2025-26, WB recorded an average annual GDP growth rate of just 5 per cent — the lowest amongst all major states and also lower than India’s 6.1 per cent (at constant 2011-12 prices). But this is not merely a story of one government’s tenure. Over the last 25 years (2000-01 to 2025-26), WB’s GDP growth averaged 5.6 per cent, against the national average of 6.3 per cent. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the state’s ranking in PCI terms has slid from 11th to 16th over this period.
That could well be one reason the BJP managed to win Bengal. But another factor widely discussed was the lack of good governance, which dissuades private-sector investments. Yet another factor could be the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). However, the debate has not focussed much on the issue of freebies (revdis), which we feel could have played a critical role in the BJP’s victory in WB. Freebies have now become a standard electoral weapon; across states, competitive populist transfers are becoming the norm.
Take Tamil Nadu (TN). The state has pioneered two trends. First, it witnessed the rise of yet another film star entering politics — continuing its long tradition of cinema icons transitioning into mass political leaders, this time with actor Joseph Vijay. Second, and perhaps more consequentially, TN institutionalised the culture of freebies in Indian politics. What began as a developmental intervention through the mid-day meal scheme for school children eventually evolved into a broader electoral strategy: Give citizens freebies, and votes will follow. Is this a bribe for votes or welfarism?
Vijay’s promised welfare bill in TN, if implemented, would cost the state exchequer roughly Rs 0.99 lakh crore, against a total budget of Rs 3.93 lakh crore. And this revdi culture exists even when TN recorded the sixth-highest GDP growth at 7.4 per cent between FY01 and FY26. One could argue that GDP growth bypasses the masses, who live more on welfare schemes. But there is more politics for votes in these freebies than true welfarism.
WB’s case is no different. The BJP manifesto did not really introduce a new freebie model; it merely scaled up what the TMC had already put in place. The existing transfers of Rs 1,500 per month for general category women and Rs 1,700 for reserved category women were proposed to be doubled to Rs 3,000 per month for all women, irrespective of caste. Of the state’s population of roughly 100 million, about 49.3 million are women, of whom nearly 35.8 million are above the age of 20 (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2019). Even if one takes this as a rough eligibility benchmark, the annual cost of such a scheme would be in the vicinity of Rs 1.29 lakh crore. Against a total state budget of Rs 3.96 lakh crore for 2026-27, this single promise could absorb almost one-third of total expenditure. If the government decides to go ahead with this bold scheme, the obvious question is: How does it plan to finance such a commitment without squeezing developmental expenditures? Will that not slow down the pace of development even further?
It must also be acknowledged that the BJP can build on some of WB’s existing opportunities. WB’s multidimensional poverty headcount ratio declined sharply from 58 per cent in 2005-06 to just 9 per cent in 2022-23 (NITI Aayog, 2024). Despite this substantial reduction in poverty, the state’s PCI ranking has remained persistently among the lower tier of states. This suggests that poverty reduction has been achieved more by revdi distribution than an accelerated growth model. This may not create ample jobs. No wonder the BJP promised Rs 3,000 per month to unemployed youth in its party manifesto. But such social security measures can only be meaningful in the short run. In due course, actual jobs need to be created. And that inevitably requires creating an environment where private investors are willing not just to enter, but also to stay. Before any government can seriously pursue such ambitions, however, it must first confront the condition of the state’s finances. WB is currently the second-most indebted major state in India, with total outstanding liabilities estimated at 38.9 per cent of GSDP in 2026, second only to Punjab’s 46.4 per cent, and well above the national average of 29.2 per cent (State Finances, 2025-26). This is where the new government’s real challenge begins: Balancing welfare commitments with the developmental expenditures, to place the state on a higher growth trajectory.
The lotus has bloomed, no doubt, in the east. But if this victory is based on revdi promises rather than development, it may not be a real and sustainable change (poriborton). The test of that will begin now with the new government.
Gulati is distinguished professor and Chanda a research associate at ICRIER. Views are personal
