For over a century, the term “Middle East” has functioned as a dominant geopolitical shorthand, a label primarily defined by the reach of the British Empire and the strategic centrality of oil. Yet, as we navigate the third decade of the 21st century, this colonial-era cartography is increasingly at odds with the functional realities of global power and the emergence of an Asian system.
In my book West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East, I argue that we are witnessing the birth of a new “West Asian” order — a transregional system that reconnects South Asia, the Middle East, and Southern Europe into a single geoeconomic and geopolitical system. This shift is not merely a change in name; it is a fundamental realignment that positions India as a primary actor in the region, rather than a peripheral observer.
The move from the “Middle East” to “West Asia” isn’t a rebranding exercise; it is a restoration of a long-standing material reality. For centuries, the Indian Ocean functioned as a cohesive, integrated system, a dense web of trade and civilisational exchange that existed long before the first Portuguese ships made landfall on the shores of India in 1498.
The European arrival triggered a structural cut in this geography. The British, in particular, replaced organic transregional links with a rigid, London-centric architecture. They treated the Eurasian rimland not as a collection of societies, but as a logistical chain stretching from Gibraltar to Singapore. In this imperial setup, the Suez Canal was the essential artery, and India was the crown jewel — the industrial and demographic heart of a maritime system designed for extraction and control.
When this architecture collapsed under the weight of two world wars, these ancient connections didn’t simply snap back. Instead, the Cold War froze the map. Geopolitics became a global struggle between democratic capitalism and communism, governed by an American-led multi-decade collective strategy of global containment. This ideological overlay obscured the maritime and economic logic that had defined the region for a millennium. And of course, the most significant shift in this geopolitical discourse came with the fall of the Soviet Union.
For at least two decades, all roads led through Washington. As the “indispensable nation,” the US projected power worldwide, unchallenged and with significant consequences. This hegemony included total control of the high seas, which enabled an exponential growth in global trade while simultaneously fuelling the deindustrialisation of Western societies — a paradox for which America would later pay a price. Nevertheless, this era also accelerated a deeper economic integration under Pax Americana, allowing ancient trade links and people-to-people ties to resurface long before the term “West Asia” had even entered the common lexicon.
And the return of West Asia has accelerated in the past two decades for multiple reasons. The most critical factor in this shift is the rise of the Arabian Gulf states as a financial and logistical powerhouse bridging Europe and Asia. This transformation has turned the region into a global nerve centre, assuming a diplomatic and economic role once reserved for European powers. Carriers like Emirates, Saudia Airlines, and Qatar Airways are not merely airlines; they have positioned the Gulf as the world’s primary air and logistics hub. This is further cemented by mega-events like the Dubai Expo and the 2022 Qatar World Cup, with Saudi Arabia set to host both in the coming years. In diplomacy, there have been mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia between Russia and Ukraine, Qatar between the DRC and Rwanda, and the UAE between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Gulf has become a new global centre of gravity.
Second, and most recently, is the scramble for security within a post-Pax Americana ecosystem. As Washington transitions from the global hegemon into a power defined by narrower self-interest, leaving behind its role as the global policeman, regional actors are forced to rethink their own security architectures. Nowhere is this strategic recalibration more front-and-centre than in West Asia/the Middle East.
Third is the collapse of the virtual borders between South Asia and West Asia. With bilateral trade hitting $80 billion with the UAE and over $40 billion with Saudi Arabia, the economic integration is undeniable. This is anchored by a diaspora of over eight million Indian workers in the Gulf. From the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the I2U2 (comprising India, Israel, the UAE, and the US) to India’s growing strategic engagement with Cyprus and Greece in the Mediterranean, the map is being redrawn into a single, expansive theatre of trade and security.
This transition necessitates a fundamental rethinking of India’s position within West Asia. First, to ensure the structural cohesion of a system that effectively merges South Asia and the Middle East, New Delhi must champion minilateral formats that include the region’s primary anchors: the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Second, India must move beyond viewing the Gulf states through the antiquated lens of labour and capital. These nations are no longer just destinations for the Indian diaspora or sources of sovereign wealth; they are also strategic hubs for Indian investment and high-tech innovation. Third, there is a need to return to cultural and religious co-existence. A West Asian order cannot be built on AI, infrastructure, and capital alone; it requires a baseline of social stability.
This playbook serves as a formal recognition of an immutable geopolitical reality: The traditional cartography of West Asia has dissolved. It has outlived its strategic utility, eclipsed by a West Asian system that reflects the hard realities of geography and the rise of the Gulf as a nerve centre between Europe and the Indian Ocean. The stability of this emerging order rests on the ability of its central stakeholders to pursue a balance of power and deeper integration across a unified Eurasian rimland.
The writer is Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and author of West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East
