4 min readFeb 11, 2026 10:49 AM IST
First published on: Feb 11, 2026 at 10:49 AM IST
In ‘Gandhi, Nehru and the ways of looking back’ (IE, February 7), Ram Madhav argues that “Gandhi tried until the end to prevent Partition”. Jawaharlal Nehru, in contrast, aimed “to grab political power by whatever means.” Madhav repeats the popular charge that in the Congress organisation, Sardar Vallabhai Patel had overwhelming support compared to Nehru, without acknowledging that the latter lacked the inclination and experience for organisational work, which he left to Patel and Rajendra Prasad. It was a classic example of power-sharing and trust in a team. The political scientist Granville Austin called it “the oligarchy of four: Prasad, Patel, Nehru and Maulana Azad”. However, Madhav ignores the fact that in November 1948, Patel admitted that Nehru had a larger following among the people while he had overwhelming support within the organisation.
Madhav also says that Subhas Chandra Bose could grasp Nehru’s “bluff”. Bose was, in fact, more critical of Patel than Nehru. As noted by Nirad Chaudhuri, “in the quarrel between Gandhi and Bose, the only man who did not become involved in its rancour or dishonour was Jawaharlal Nehru”.
Nehru never concealed his differences with Gandhi. The latter was aware of Nehru’s radicalism but was also convinced that this could be contained. In fact, Nehru mellowed when he became Congress president in 1936, as he could understand the complexities and limited support base of the Left, and the fact that the Congress organisational setup was controlled by Patel and Prasad. He differed from Bose on Gandhi’s role in Congress. Gandhi saw Nehru as a counter to Bose’s popularity among urbanised intellectuals and the youth. Gandhi wanted Nehru to be his successor, as he was aware of the latter’s capacity to chart out a new course without disturbing the political equilibrium in an infant nation. Patel, with his pragmatism and sense of service, supported Gandhi.
Madhav does not mention the role of Viceroy Linlithgow, who was instigated by Winston Churchill and fellow defenders of the Empire to encourage Jinnah to be more belligerent towards Congress. The Muslim League offered the British unconditional support in World War II if the colonial state accepted it as the only representative of Indian Muslims.
The subsequent hardening of the Congress position and Nehru’s unilateralism later was an attempt to counter the nefarious acts of Linlithgow and Jinnah. Gandhi understood the colonial administration’s game of divide and rule. On April 1, 1940, he said, “Muslims have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim division.”
After the failure of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944, the younger lot led by Nehru and Patel were at the forefront. In the 1946 elections, the League and Congress were the clear winners. The collective leadership of Congress steered the country towards a stable democratic order, in which Patel and Nehru were two sides of the same coin.
Gandhi was vehemently opposed to Partition and carried his commitment to composite nationalism till his last breath. But it is often forgotten that he was a practical idealist and his life was a series of experiments with truth. Madhav ignores the fact that in a triangular situation, two sides are always larger than the third.
The writer retired as professor of Political Science, Delhi University
