It may be argued that the end of the Cold War, America’s triumphalism, the trauma of 9/11, the acceleration of globalisation, and the consolidation of a liberal international order together laid the foundations of what the 21st century now confronts as a ‘polycrisis’. We are witnessing the simultaneous unfolding of multiple, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing crises — financial instability, climate stress, technological disruption, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet it would not be incorrect to suggest that the defining rupture of this polycrisis has been the 2022 war in Ukraine, whose cascading consequences continue to reshape global politics.
The ongoing conflict, combined with US President Donald J. Trump’s second term in office, has intensified this turbulence. In many ways, the signals were visible during his first term; the second has merely amplified them. What we are witnessing is not simply policy divergence but a deeper geopolitical rupture.
The war in Ukraine and Trump’s renewed presidency have accelerated an already unfolding global churn, compelling states to navigate a profoundly unsettled environment marked by widening divisions. On one side stands a fragmented West, grappling with internal fissures — particularly between the United States and Europe. On the other, a more assertive Global South is emerging, no longer willing to passively accept rules crafted elsewhere but increasingly determined to shape the frameworks that govern international order.
The roles played by India and China during the Ukraine conflict, and their continued assertiveness in global and regional arenas, underscore this shift. Despite sustained pressure, the US-led West has found it increasingly difficult to impose its preferred outcomes on major developing powers. This signals not merely policy disagreement but a dilution of Western dominance.
The 21st century thus appears to be experiencing a systemic inflection point, driven in considerable measure by the actions of the United States, the erstwhile hegemon. Trump’s withdrawal from key post-war multilateral commitments, his remarks regarding Greenland, US military actions targeting Iran, threats to recalibrate commitments to NATO, and the proposal of a so-called ‘Board of Peace’ together suggest a deeper unease within global governance structures. These moves reflect not confidence but strategic anxiety — symptoms of a hegemon grappling with relative decline and recalibrating its global role.
Crisis in Global Governance
The ripple effects of these developments are visible across multiple domains. The expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia has revived anxieties about strategic arms competition. China’s reluctance to enter a new arms control framework proposed by Washington further complicates strategic stability. Efforts at peace negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine and the United States — including those reportedly explored in the UAE — have thus far yielded limited progress. Meanwhile, the weaponisation of sanctions, escalating tariff disputes, renewed US–Iran tensions, a defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the lifting of sanctions on Bosnian Serb separatist leader Milorad Dodik collectively point towards an increasingly fragmented order.
Taken together, these episodes illustrate a world in transition. The post-war architecture of collective security appears strained, and the durability of multilateral institutions is under question. The compass of global governance seems unsteady.
This clash of worldviews was vividly displayed at the January 2026 Davos Summit, where speeches by Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney exposed the depth of transatlantic discord. Carney’s remarks reflected a growing erosion of trust in US leadership and urged smaller and middle powers to collaborate in shaping a rebalanced world order — one that harmonises values with political realism and shared responsibility.
In contrast, Trump’s address — steeped in ‘Make America Great Again’ rhetoric — was met with scepticism by allies and observers alike. His reiteration of intentions to assume control over Greenland in the name of US security, alongside criticisms of NATO as a disproportionate financial burden, underscored tensions within the alliance. Absent from his remarks was any acknowledgement that NATO had invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in response to the 9/11 attacks, standing in solidarity with the United States.
Closer to India’s neighbourhood, the regional landscape offers little comfort. Political transitions in Bangladesh and Myanmar, persistent instability in South Asia, diminishing US engagement in parts of the Indo-Pacific, deepening coordination among Russia, China and North Korea, and the growing prominence of groupings such as the SCO and BRICS+ all signal a shifting balance of power. These trends suggest not consolidation but diffusion — an order moving towards fragmentation rather than cohesion.
The Idea of Quadro
Against this backdrop emerges the idea of Quadro — a quadrilateral partnership comprising India, Russia, the United States and China. At once ambitious and seemingly utopian, Quadro seeks to imagine structured engagement among the four most consequential poles of contemporary geopolitics.
If such a framework were to materialise, it would likely resemble a concert-style stabilisation mechanism — akin to the Concert of Europe — or draw lessons from Cold War arms control arrangements and even the contemporary G20 format. Its success would depend on functional cooperation rather than ideological alignment. A civilisational or values-based framework would risk immediate collapse; a pragmatic, issue-based architecture might stand a greater chance.
The international system is tentatively exploring forms of power-sharing within a multipolar setting, though hegemonic impulses continue to impede genuine accommodation. Major powers — including these four — have experimented with issue-based cooperation in areas such as climate change, artificial intelligence and financial stability. There is an emerging recognition that no single power can dominate every domain indefinitely.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, China sought to leverage its centrality in global supply chains. More recently, it has attempted to consolidate influence over critical minerals. Yet countervailing coalitions have formed in response, demonstrating that concentrations of power generate balancing mechanisms. In this sense, Quadro reflects a structural reality: global public goods cannot be supplied by any single actor.
Stability in such a system would require recognition — not denial — of power asymmetries. It would necessitate mutual acknowledgement of core interests, sustained channels of crisis communication, and selective cooperation even amid rivalry. Instances of India and China coordinating on global climate issues demonstrate that pragmatic engagement remains possible despite strategic distrust.
What might emerge from this is a form of ‘polytunity’ — a purposeful realism that blends pluralism with unity. Polytunity does not eliminate rivalry; it manages it through structured engagement among indispensable actors.
The Challenges to Quadro
Yet formidable challenges persist. All four states prioritise national interest and maintain distinct conceptions of spheres of influence. Where such spheres intersect, ‘shatter zones’ emerge — regions vulnerable to proxy competition and instability.
History offers cautionary lessons. Even during the Second World War, while the United States and the United Kingdom cooperated against Nazi Germany after the Soviet Union was attacked, competition for influence persisted between Roosevelt and Churchill. Alliances do not erase rivalry; they merely reconfigure it.
In the contemporary context, a telling indicator would be China’s stance on India’s long-standing aspiration for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Were Beijing to support India’s candidature without linking it to Pakistan’s inclusion, it would signal strategic accommodation of the highest order. Such a gesture would serve as a litmus test for the viability of Quadro.
India’s Strategic Autonomy
India occupies a distinctive position in this evolving order. Historically a leading voice of the developing world, it has consistently advocated inclusive platforms. Its presidency of the G20, which facilitated the African Union’s entry as a permanent member, reflects this approach.
Simultaneously, India remains committed to preserving its strategic autonomy. It carefully balances relations with the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the European Union and others, resisting rigid bloc politics. While advocating reform of the UN Security Council, it also participates in diverse minilateral groupings such as the SCO, RIC and BRICS.
India’s own experience — particularly its exclusion from permanent UNSC membership despite broad international support — may temper enthusiasm for elite frameworks that risk marginalising others. Its reluctance to join initiatives such as the proposed Board of Peace further illustrates this caution.
Rather than being confined within a rigid quadrilateral, New Delhi appears more inclined towards a reformed multipolarity—towards polytunity rather than bloc consolidation.
Conclusion
Quadro, as a conceptual proposition, carries undeniable appeal. The United States, China, Russia and India are unequal in power yet indispensable in different domains — military reach, economic scale, technological innovation, demographic weight and normative influence. Their structured engagement could potentially stabilise an unsettled order.
However, the profound mistrust and strategic competition among them pose significant obstacles. Moreover, other influential actors — Japan, Brazil, the European Union, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others — are equally consequential. Excluding them risks fostering new bloc formations and further fragmentation.
A wise observation suggests that ‘There will be peace when it is profitable’. If cooperative equilibrium proves beneficial to all four — and does not marginalise others — Quadro may transcend utopia. If not, selective exclusion and competitive spheres of influence may return the world to the very crises it now seeks to resolve.
In an era of geopolitical rupture, Quadro remains suspended between possibility and illusion — its future contingent not on rhetoric but on the hard calculus of shared interest, restraint and pragmatic statecraft.
(Dr Indrani Talukdar is a Fellow at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
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