The Strait of Hormuz is, today, the epicentre of a global economic and maritime crisis. Following the unprovoked US-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, the waterway now has the status of a “war zone”, placing severe restrictions on the passage of global shipping. Impacting nearly 20 per cent of the world’s oil and 25 per cent of LNG trade, this is the most significant disruption to global energy supply since the 1970s.
Its navy may have been destroyed, but the threat posed by Iran’s coastal missile batteries, drone swarms, and sea mines has been sufficient to deter all but the most desperate commercial shipping from attempting a passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Marine insurance premiums have jumped from 400 per cent to 600 per cent, and Iran is reportedly demanding tolls of up to $1 per barrel of oil for transit, a measure seen as “extortionate”. Yet this challenge defies an easy or swift resolution. It is essential to step back and grasp the full interplay of legal, strategic, and political factors at work.
An overwhelming majority of global trade travels by sea, and while the oceans may appear vast, the compulsions of safe and expeditious transit tend to funnel shipping traffic through a set of narrow waterways, termed “maritime choke points” — constricted channels that connect major seas. By controlling access to vital seas, these choke points have, historically, amplified naval power projection, turning geography into a force multiplier for maritime powers.
“Pax Britannica”, which defined Britain’s role as the global hegemon between 1815 and 1914, was built upon its control over strategic locations like Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Oman, Singapore and Cape Town, which dominated choke points and sea lanes. In World War I, the Dardanelles Strait played a pivotal role in prolonging the survival of the Ottoman Empire, when successive Allied amphibious assaults were thwarted by the Turks.
In the current scenario, US President Donald Trump’s obsession with acquiring Greenland, and regaining control of the Panama Canal Zone may arouse derision, but it is rooted in strategic concern regarding the control of choke points, particularly in the context of rising competition with China and Russia. Greenland happens to be the northern anchor of the strategic Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap, a narrow transit corridor that is the primary exit for Russia’s Northern Fleet from its Arctic bases. As for China, with the melting of the Arctic ice, it is actively eying the Northern Sea Route via the GIUK Gap as a polar extension of its Maritime Silk Road.
The principle that the sea was international territory, and that all nations were free to use it for trade, has a hoary provenance, going back to the concept of Mare Liberum, or “free sea”, proposed by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in 1609. Since nations had taken to arbitrary extensions of territorial waters, order and regulation were restored by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which fixed the limit of “territorial waters” at 12 miles. Maritime choke points have, however, created a hurdle to the established principle of freedom of navigation because they often fall within the territorial waters of one or more states.
To prevent global commerce from being held hostage by geography, two legal regimes were adopted by UNCLOS for shipping to negotiate territorial waters. One was the concept of “Innocent Passage” that allows a vessel to pass through the territorial waters of a state, subject to stringent restrictions on movement and activities, including suspension of passage. A similar right, termed “Transit Passage”, was created, applicable only to international straits, granting freedom of navigation solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of global trade. Unlike in the case of innocent passage, the coastal state cannot suspend or hamper transit passage in any way, nor can it discriminate between flags.
The Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, qualifies as a “strait used for international navigation” under UNCLOS. The entire navigable corridor of this strait falls within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. Iran signed the UNCLOS in 1982, but has not (like the US) ratified it so far. Having deliberately chosen to apply the restrictive Innocent Passage clause, Iran’s closure of the Strait brings it into direct conflict with the UNCLOS regime of Transit Passage, designed precisely to prevent such a unilateral blockade of strategic straits.
Maritime choke points are the physical manifestations of global interdependence. While coastal states like Iran and Oman or those bordering the Malacca Strait have legitimate interests in protecting their waters from threats such as pollution and smuggling, international law, specifically the regime of Transit Passage, denies them the right to interfere with the flow of global shipping. Moreover, an attempt to exercise control by mining, or the threat of kinetic action, would be seen as an illegal and aggressive action under the UN Charter.
However, Iran faces stark choices against overwhelming military odds. With its political and military leadership brutally decapitated, its economy under a total embargo, and its infrastructure devastated by heavy bombardment, the Strait of Hormuz remains this beleaguered nation’s final strategic lever. Tehran is likely to exploit this choke point to extract maximum concessions from its adversaries.
For India, the Strait of Hormuz is no mere waterway but a vital “jugular vein”, whose closure or disruption poses a grave threat to national security, economic growth and domestic stability. The continuation of this conflict also evokes the unthinkable spectre of a “mushroom cloud” over the region.
Given its international standing and cordial ties with the three primary actors — the US, Israel, and Iran — India’s peremptory dismissal of a mediatory role, yielding centre stage to Pakistan, remains a puzzling diplomatic choice. Nevertheless, in keeping with its traditional strategic culture, India must continue to leverage quiet diplomacy to safeguard its own interests while urging all parties to comply with UN laws and mandates, not only for the sake of regional peace, but also to avoid widespread economic distress in the Global South.
The writer is a former Indian Navy chief
