3 min readMar 11, 2026 06:13 AM IST
First published on: Mar 11, 2026 at 06:00 AM IST
The joint strikes by the US and Israel may have severely degraded Iran’s military since the war began on February 28. But in the face of US President Donald Trump’s constantly shifting aims — from regime change to “unconditional surrender” — Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assuming his father’s mantle signals an assertion of defiance by Tehran. If Trump’s plan was to replicate the Venezuela model in Iran, it does not appear to be working. There is no sign of a Delcy Rodríguez waiting in the wings, and Trump saying that “most of the people we had in mind are dead” can be read as an admission that the prospect of installing a leader acceptable to Washington looks distant. Instead of forcing the regime to change course, the war appears to be hardening Iran’s resistance.
If regime change, or a variation of it, does not materialise in Iran, Washington will have to start thinking about the timing and terms for the war to end. A prolonged war that leads to American casualties is hardly compatible with an “America First” presidency. The enormous costs of war include its severe economic consequences. As oil prices briefly surged close to $120 a barrel on Monday, Trump said the war was “very complete, pretty much” and would end “very soon”. Yet if the unilateralism and arbitrariness with which he weaponised tariffs across the world are anything to go by, his assurances cannot be taken at face value. For the rest of the world, second-guessing Trump is risky and can prove costly.
Ending the war would require circling back to questions that lay at its beginning and finding answers in diplomacy — questions around Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and its patronage of proxy militias across the region, and the nature of constraints, if any, on them. Another challenge will be persuading Israel, which appears to view the war as its best chance to resolve the Iranian threat once and for all. Operation Roaring Lion has temporarily united the country after two years of conflict and the long wait for hostages in Gaza. For Netanyahu, facing a reckoning for his government’s failure to prevent Hamas’s terror attack, the war with Iran in an election year further delays accountability at home. Iran’s regime, too, while desperately clinging to power, will not want its military and economy battered beyond repair. The war, then, is likely to end when all three principal players, from their different vantage points, recognise the necessity of an off-ramp. The sooner they do so, the better.
