US President Donald Trump’s offer to India to become a member of the Gaza Peace Board has as yet elicited no formal response. Since there are several countries on the offer list, the absence of an immediate Indian response has prompted speculation. It is not a binary choice; several factors are at play while analysing the invitation and any eventual decision on it.
India is rightly not indicating any urgency in taking a decision on the invitation, which was reportedly conveyed through a formal letter from the US President on January 18. With the kind of churn in international geopolitics and competing issues up for consideration, deliberations would probably be underway to assess the legal, political, and strategic implications of the proposal.
This restraint is consistent with India’s long-standing emphasis on strategic autonomy, particularly in theatres marked by deep polarisation and institutional contestation. Undoubtedly, decisions of this nature require calibration rather than haste.
Understanding the Board of Peace
The Board of Peace, announced by President Trump this month, is a mechanism to oversee Gaza’s post-war reconstruction and transitional governance. It is envisaged as a high-level body, chaired by Trump himself, with participation from select political leaders, international figures, and invited states. Among those reportedly associated with the initiative are World Bank President Ajay Banga and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Media reports suggest that between 25 and 35 countries—including Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE—have accepted invitations to participate. A leaked draft charter has added another layer of complexity, indicating that permanent membership could be secured through a financial contribution of $1 billion, ostensibly to fund reconstruction and administrative functions.
Alongside the governance board, the proposal also refers to an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). Here, India’s position is clearer. New Delhi has already ruled out contributing troops, as the force would not operate under a UN peacekeeping mandate.
Recent commentary emerging from the World Economic Forum at Davos, including remarks attributed to Jared Kushner, further underlines this ambiguity. Gaza’s future has been spoken of increasingly in the language of reconstruction models, economic potential, and redevelopment frameworks—almost as a post-conflict economic project.
While investment and rebuilding are indispensable, the emphasis on reconstruction without an accompanying political roadmap risks treating Gaza as a technical or commercial challenge rather than a longstanding, deeply rooted political dispute. Development, however ambitious, cannot substitute for legitimacy.
Why caution is understandable?
Any Indian assessment of the proposal is likely to revolve around three core concerns, and understandably so.
First is the centrality of the United Nations. India has historically supported UN-led multilateralism—not because the system is flawless, but because alternatives that bypass established frameworks risk further fragmenting global governance. The Board of Peace is viewed by many observers as operating outside, and potentially parallel to, the UN Security Council. At a time when the international order is already strained by selective rule-making and competing institutional architectures, additional breaches could weaken the world’s ability to manage conflict or even sustain stability.
Second is the absence of a clearly articulated political end state. India has consistently supported a negotiated two-state solution as the only durable path to peace between Israel and Palestine. Yet, in the current articulation of the Gaza plan, this framework barely features. Stabilisation, reconstruction, and transitional governance are necessary—but without a credible political horizon, they risk becoming mechanisms for managing conflict rather than resolving it.
Third is domestic and political sensitivity. While foreign policy is not made by consensus, political undercurrents cannot be ignored—particularly on issues with strong moral and historical resonance.
A “Yes… But” as an Analytical Lens
It is in this context that in a television discussion I alluded to the phraseology “Yes… but”—not as a declaration of policy, but as a way of thinking through India’s options.
“Yes” to humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and efforts to end violence in Gaza.
“Yes” to dialogue with all stakeholders, including the US and key regional actors.
I stated in addition—
“But” not at the cost of undermining multilateral legitimacy and diluting the authority of the United Nations.
“But” not without clarity on long-term political settlement.
“But” not in ways that compromise India’s strategic autonomy or entangle it in awkward governance arrangements.
There remain other options too—unconditional endorsement, outright rejection, or studied silence but each of these carry costs. With information at premium, I consider full endorsement as risking premature alignment with an initiative whose legal footing and longevity remain uncertain. Rejection would diminish India’s ability to shape outcomes. Silence cedes diplomatic space to others.
Under the explained circumstances and with the above analysis, the conditional engagement being recommended, by contrast, could be seen to be preserving flexibility.
Strategic Autonomy in a Fractured Order
India’s broader concern is not limited to Gaza alone. The steady erosion of shared norms, the proliferation of ad hoc arrangements, and the weakening of collective decision-making mechanisms are reshaping the global landscape. Each additional deviation from agreed frameworks makes future cooperation harder—not easier. It does not make the Gaza task any easier, but the sustainability of a wholly untested format could remain in suspense. For a country that seeks a larger role in global governance, the challenge is to engage without endorsing disorder.
If parallel proposals emerge that credibly advance a political settlement rooted in long-held international positions—including Palestinian statehood and Israel’s security—India would have every reason to support them. Until then, caution is not hesitation; it is an expression of responsibility. Peace initiatives that weaken established norms may deliver speed, but they rarely deliver sustainability.
In a world where strategic impatience increasingly defines great-power behaviour, India’s measured pause may be its most valuable contribution. For much of 2025 we have witnessed Indian restraint as a policy. Restraint continues to spell responsibility, not hesitation. Sooner rather than later the world will realise how correct India has been.
(The writer is the former Commander of India’s Srinagar-based Chinar Corps. Currently he is the Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir and a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)
End of Article
